irishrover
Global Moderator
Joined: June 2014
Posts: 3,372
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Post by irishrover on Mar 17, 2016 13:28:23 GMT
The point about Sainsbury's is that they are a massive company who have long history of planning deals and are going to try every legal loophole and bargaining chip to get maximum results from any particular deal. But they were also this when we got into bed with them in the first place. It's not as though Sainsbury's behaviour in these matters is unknown - there is a whole 30 year (at least) rotten path of manipulating planning committee, courts, communities and partners at every stage in every deal. When all of this was being done in our favour most Rovers fans were quite happy to laud Sainsbury's, its backhanded strategies and its potential value as a resource for the people of Horfield and damn those opposing Sainsbury's on these terms as a bunch of hippies and hypocrits. Now, apparently they are corporate rotters again preying on the little guy, which ironically now aligns the argument with the perspective of the Gloucester Road traders who essentially have the same position.
The point is whatever happens Rovers get to be the good guys in this narrative whereas everyone else in this game (from Sainbury's to Radice to the traders etc) are painted as self-interested b'stards who were trying to manipulate the system in their favour. The truth is we were at it as much as anyone else and we were quite happy to validate Sainsbury's dodgy tactics when they were working in our favour.
So instead of doing the ethical gymnastics I think I'll just say that we did a deal with the devil and we got burned but it could have been far worse. Some clubs have lost stadiums and gone into administration largely off the back of bad property deals done with supermarkets over the years. It is, and always was, a double-edged sword. We have basically managed to come out of it with a narrow(ish) defeat and a clean slate. That's more than a lot have managed and we should be thankful. For the deal itself though - the buck stops at the top of Bristol Rovers football club. Responsibility cannot be passed downwards and outwards and that was always the problem I had with the previous regime - the tendency to deflect rather than front up. If Higgs went into this with his eyes shut thinking Sainsbury's were going to benign business partners then given his vast experience in this area that would have been shown staggering naivety. I think he knew exactly what he was doing, he took the gamble and it didn't come off and that is his legacy. The buck stops ultimately stops there - you do a deal, you assess the relative risks and you take responsibility for the success or failure of the project; that's leadership.
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Deleted
Joined: January 1970
Posts: 0
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Post by Deleted on Mar 17, 2016 13:37:22 GMT
Can we just exonerate Mrs Justce Proudman, who some painted as clearly an incompetent at the time.
She's been proven right on two fronts: 1. Her decision; 2. In saying 'If I'm wrong, and I don't think I am, ...'
The clues were there. Shame Higgs thought he knew better and people were daft enough to cheer him on.
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Deleted
Joined: January 1970
Posts: 0
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Post by Deleted on Mar 17, 2016 13:39:44 GMT
In Higgs we trust? If he had thought that we were going to win, he would not have sold the club, would he? The drawn-out pantomime is now over. Can we now get rid of Watola? He is associated with the whole sorry episode from start to finish. He has no credibility left with BRFC supporters and should be dispensed with. Harsh, but perfectly fair. I think with any regime change, it's only prudent to keep the best of what you have and replace with better. If Mr Watola (with a silent 'T') is replaced, I would hope the replacement has a better working cv and can seek to improve on his position. With all the contacts and experience the new encumbrances bring, I'm more than confident that a suitable replacement can be found, and instinctively I would applaud that immediately. My 103 year old Grandma would do better than that quarter witted cretin, despite having died at 89 and having dementia.
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Post by manchestergas on Mar 17, 2016 13:45:00 GMT
Can we just exonerate Mrs Justce Proudman, who some painted as clearly an incompetent at the time. She's been proven right on two fronts: 1. Her decision; 2. In saying 'If I'm wrong, and I don't think I am, ...' The clues were there. Shame Higgs thought he knew better and people were daft enough to cheer him on. Didn't one poster on here suggest the 'If I'm wrong, and I don't think I am, ...' comments was a message to the Court of Appeal to overture her decision. Doesn't seem it worked. and please Mr W no more appeals!
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mjg
Mickey Barrett
Joined: September 2014
Posts: 48
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Post by mjg on Mar 17, 2016 13:48:47 GMT
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Post by Henbury Gas on Mar 17, 2016 13:52:18 GMT
Yes of course, based on an average attendance of 6000 of which 75% would be of an age that bought groceries, an average monthly spend of £200 pp and Sainsbury share of the market at 16.8% then we would need approximately 19 years to recover the £30million. Don't count me in to your calculations, I'll shop wherever I get the best produce at the best price. yep your defo an Aldi man Bamber
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faggotygas
Byron Anthony
Joined: May 2014
Posts: 1,862
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Post by faggotygas on Mar 17, 2016 13:53:33 GMT
Continue our boycott of Sainsburys stores forever now Too right, how dare they insist that contract terms are adhered to.
There can be a difference between legal and moral. We had a number of bids for the Mem at the time, we accepted the highest. Some years down the line, they pull out because it suits them to.
Ignoring the court case, Sainsburys cost us a lot of money with this spoiling bid, both in the direct spend on the Mem redevelopment and UWE stadium, and opportunity cost if we had sold to somebody who was actually serious about buying. If this was a deal to sell your house, you'd be pretty hacked off with the other party, and we are well within our rights to be hacked off by the poor business behaviour of Sainsburys.
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Peter Parker
Global Moderator
Richard Walker
You have been sentenced to DELETION!
Joined: May 2014
Posts: 4,920
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Post by Peter Parker on Mar 17, 2016 13:57:51 GMT
this is basically the killer bit after this issue ii going against us, the Judge(s) decide that the other issues are irrelevant or superseded by issue ii
Issue (ii): were Sainsbury’s in breach of paragraph 2.8 of Schedule 1 by failing to pursue a further section 73 application seeking to have condition 11 removed? 76. If a section 73 application is properly to be treated as an Appeal for the purposes of paragraph 2.11 of Schedule 1 to the Agreement, then the failure to launch a second such application would not put Sainsbury’s in breach of the “all reasonable endeavours” obligation in paragraph 2.8. That is because the launching of an Appeal was only required (as opposed to permitted) if the 60% test was passed, and it was not. This was the critical issue which caused Bristol to lose before the judge. For her, the conclusive argument was that the parties had agreed to treat section 73 applications as appeals for the purposes of paragraph 2.11 of Schedule 1, in such a way as to give rise to an estoppel by convention. 77. To recapitulate, the contractual definition of “Appeal” includes, amongst other things: “an application to the Secretary of State in accordance with section 73 of the Planning Act in respect of the grant of a Planning Permission which is not an Acceptable Planning Permission”. 78. An application under section 73 is of course made to the local planning authority and not to the Secretary of State. Given the express reference to section 73, however, I would with respect to the judge, have concluded that the words “to the Secretary of State” were a draughtsman’s slip which the informed reader would instinctively correct. 79. The definition is not, however, an all-purpose one. The introductory words of the definition say that an appeal “means all or any of the following as the case may be”. Mr Matthias submitted that, in the case of paragraph 2.11 of Schedule 1, an Appeal has the more limited meaning of an appeal, properly so-called, to the Secretary of State under section 78. The other listed items within the definition, namely a call-in and an application under section 73 were not imported into paragraph 2.11. 80. It is not necessary to consider Mr Matthias’s submissions on this topic any further because Mr Wonnacott did not engage with them. He argued the appeal on the footing that Mr Matthias was right, and that, simply as a matter of contractual interpretation, a section 73 application was not an Appeal for the purposes of paragraph 2.11. 81. Mr Matthias accepted that in concluding the September/October 2013 agreement, and carrying it out, the parties had acted on the common assumption that a section 73 application was an Appeal. However, he submitted that the judge had been wrong to hold that the estoppel by convention continued to have effect after the refusal of the section 73 application by BCC on 28 January 2014. Once that application had run its course, the parties were free to resile from the common assumption as to the meaning of Appeal. There was nothing in the September/October 2013 agreement which touched on events outside the scope of that agreement itself. Neither side had argued at trial that the collateral agreement under which Sainsbury’s agreed to make its section 73 application had a significance beyond 28 January 2014. Indeed Sainsbury’s had argued that any estoppel by convention that was generated would only have been binding in the event that the section 73 application had been successful. 82. Mr Matthias points out that Sainsbury’s did not decline to make a further section 73 application on the basis that it was an Appeal which had not passed the 60% test. Instead it had argued that any new permission would still be subject to a Store Onerous Condition because it would be accompanied by unacceptable noise mitigation measures, or that they were not obliged to make more than one such application. 83. Mr Wonnacott supported the decision of the judge. In addition to drawing attention to the passages in the later correspondence which I have set out in paragraphs 42 and 43 above, he relies on the fact that it was part of Bristol’s case that there was an estoppel by convention that a section 73 application was an Appeal for the purposes of the Agreement. Bristol had so argued in order to defer the Cut Off Date by relying on the section 73 application made by Sainsbury’s. Thus, for example, in paragraph 14 be of the re-re-amended defence, Bristol pleaded: “Further or alternatively, the parties acted on a shared assumption that an Application pursuant to Section 73 in respect of a Planning Permission which was not an Acceptable Planning Permission constituted an Appeal in the context of the Agreement, in that the Claimant made such an assertion through its solicitors but offered to pursue an Appeal by way of an application without first seeking the advice of Planning Counsel as to the prospects of such an Appeal succeeding, if the Defendant would agree that condition 11 of the Original Permission constituted a Store Onerous Condition, and the Defendant accepted such offer and agreed that condition 11 of the Original Permission constituted a Store Onerous Condition in consideration of the Claimant making such application without first seeking the advice of Planning Counsel. In the premises it would be unjust and unconscionable for the Claimant now to be permitted to go back upon that shared assumption, and the Claimant is estopped by convention from doing so.” 84. I start with the principles. In Republic of India v India Steamship Co Ltd (No 2) [1998] AC 878 at page 913 Lord Steyn set out the requirements of an estoppel by convention: “It is settled that an estoppel by convention may arise where parties to a transaction act on an assumed state of facts or law, the assumption being either shared by them both or made by one and acquiesced in by the other. The effect of an estoppel by convention is to preclude a party from denying the assumed facts or law if it would be unjust to allow him to go back on the assumption: The August Leonhardt [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 28; The Vistafjord [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 343; Treitel, Law of Contracts, 9th ed., at 112-113. It is not enough that each of the two parties acts on an assumption not communicated to the other. But it was rightly accepted by counsel for both parties that a concluded agreement is not a requirement for an estoppel by convention.” 85. In Hiscox v. Outhwaite [1992] 1 AC 562 at 575 Lord Donaldson added the rider: “once a common assumption is revealed to be erroneous, the estoppel will not apply to future dealings.” 86. In Troop v Gibson [1986] EGLR 1 Ralph Gibson LJ said: “… the doctrine of estoppel, when applied, deprives a party of the ability to enforce a legal right for the period of time and to the extent required by the equity which the estoppel has raised….” 87. As to the way in which the estoppel operates, Mr Wonnacott placed some reliance on what Lord Denning said in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd. [1982] QB 84. First, in a passage concerned with the way in which “a course of dealing may give rise to obligations” he said at page 121: “If it can be used to introduce terms which are not already there, it must also be available to add to, or vary, terms which are there already, or to interpret them. If parties to a contract, by their course of dealing, put a particular interpretation on the terms of it – on the face of which each of them – to the knowledge of the other – acts conducts their mutual affairs – they are bound by that interpretation just as much as if they had written it down as being a variation of the contract.” 88. Later, in the same section of his judgement, Lord Denning said this: “So I come to this conclusion: When the parties to a contract are both under a common mistake as to the meaning or effect of it – and thereafter embark on a course of dealing on the footing of that mistake – thereby replacing the original terms of the contract by a conventional basis on which they both conduct their affairs, then the original contract is replaced by the conventional basis. The parties are bound by the conventional basis. Either party can sue or be sued upon it just as if it had been expressly agreed between them.” 89. Finally, under the heading “Conclusion”, Lord Denning said: “When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption – either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so. If one of them does seek to go back on it, the courts will give the other side remedy as the equity of the cases demands.” 90. Under the September/October 2013 agreement Sainsbury’s secured agreement that Condition 11 was a Store Onerous Condition, something which was in dispute, and could have been resolved against them. This was to the disadvantage of Bristol, who could otherwise have contended that the Store Planning Condition was satisfied. In return for Bristol’s agreement about Condition 11, Sainsbury’s agreed to lodge a section 73 application, a step which, on the common misapprehension that it was an Appeal, would otherwise have needed to pass the 60% test. This was a concession by Sainsbury’s, who could (on the mistaken assumption) have insisted on the matter being placed before Planning Counsel, jointly instructed by the parties. It was also (on the mistaken assumption) a perceived benefit to Bristol, who thereby avoided any possibility of Planning Counsel rating the prospects as less than 60%. Both sides were concerned to avoid potential uncertainties which could have been fatal to their immediate objectives: in the case of Sainsbury’s to avoid the Agreement becoming unconditional, and in the case of Bristol to avoid Sainsbury’s planning obligations becoming spent. 91. The compromise was plainly determinative of the question whether a section 73 application was an Appeal for the purposes of the September/October 2013 agreement. Did the compromise bind the parties so that neither could subsequently assert that a section 73 application was not an Appeal, even after 28 January 2014 when the section 73 application was refused? It would do so only if it would be unconscionable for them to do so. 92. The judge did not spell out the reasons why she considered that it would be unconscionable for the parties to resile from the common assumption that a section 73 application was an Appeal for the purposes of the Agreement. However, it is not difficult to see why this should be so. Firstly, although the mistaken common assumption about the meaning of Appeal in paragraph 2.11 of Schedule 1 occurred in the context of the September/October 2013 agreement, it was a common assumption about the way in which the main Agreement, and in particular paragraph 2.11 of Schedule 1 of that Agreement, worked. The date 28 January 2014 (the date of the refusal of Sainsbury’s section 73 application) therefore has no significance so far as the continued effect of the estoppel is concerned. Secondly, although the question of whether a section 73 application is an Appeal may seem an incidental and somewhat recondite question, its consequences for the operation of the Agreement are very important. Whether or not such an application is an Appeal can have an impact both on whether the Agreement becomes terminable (through the definition of Cut Off Date) and on whether Sainsbury’s are placed in breach of their obligations in paragraph 2.8 of Schedule 1. For Bristol to resile from the common assumption so as to place Sainsbury’s in breach is, on the face of it, unconscionable. Thirdly, although Sainsbury’s never expressly asserted that they were not obliged to lodge a second section 73 application because it was an Appeal which had not passed the section 73 test, preferring to rely on other points, it was plainly a part of their armoury on which they were entitled to rely. Fourthly Bristol never revealed to Sainsbury’s that it considered the common assumption to be erroneous. On the contrary, it continued to rely on the common assumption, and to assert that it would be unconscionable for Sainsbury’s to resile from it. 93. In those circumstances it would, in my judgment, plainly be unjust to allow Bristol now to assert that Sainsbury’s failure to lodge a further section 73 application was a breach of its planning obligations. Sainsbury’s were not obliged to lodge such an application unless Planning Counsel advised that it passed the 60% test, and this had not occurred.
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eppinggas
Administrator
Ian Alexander
Don't care
Joined: June 2014
Posts: 8,173
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Post by eppinggas on Mar 17, 2016 14:02:27 GMT
Yeah - that's exactly how I saw it.
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Post by belmontman on Mar 17, 2016 14:08:38 GMT
Issue (ii): were Sainsbury’s in breach of paragraph 2.8 of Schedule 1 by failing to pursue a further section 73 application seeking to have condition 11 removed? 76. If a section 73 application is properly to be treated as an Appeal for the purposes of paragraph 2.11 of Schedule 1 to the Agreement, then the failure to launch a second such application would not put Sainsbury’s in breach of the “all reasonable endeavours” obligation in paragraph 2.8. That is because the launching of an Appeal was only required (as opposed to permitted) if the 60% test was passed, and it was not. This was the critical issue which caused Bristol to lose before the judge. For her, the conclusive argument was that the parties had agreed to treat section 73 applications as appeals for the purposes of paragraph 2.11 of Schedule 1, in such a way as to give rise to an estoppel by convention. 77. To recapitulate, the contractual definition of “Appeal” includes, amongst other things: “an application to the Secretary of State in accordance with section 73 of the Planning Act in respect of the grant of a Planning Permission which is not an Acceptable Planning Permission”. 78. An application under section 73 is of course made to the local planning authority and not to the Secretary of State. Given the express reference to section 73, however, I would with respect to the judge, have concluded that the words “to the Secretary of State” were a draughtsman’s slip which the informed reader would instinctively correct. 79. The definition is not, however, an all-purpose one. The introductory words of the definition say that an appeal “means all or any of the following as the case may be”. Mr Matthias submitted that, in the case of paragraph 2.11 of Schedule 1, an Appeal has the more limited meaning of an appeal, properly so-called, to the Secretary of State under section 78. The other listed items within the definition, namely a call-in and an application under section 73 were not imported into paragraph 2.11. 80. It is not necessary to consider Mr Matthias’s submissions on this topic any further because Mr Wonnacott did not engage with them. He argued the appeal on the footing that Mr Matthias was right, and that, simply as a matter of contractual interpretation, a section 73 application was not an Appeal for the purposes of paragraph 2.11. 81. Mr Matthias accepted that in concluding the September/October 2013 agreement, and carrying it out, the parties had acted on the common assumption that a section 73 application was an Appeal. However, he submitted that the judge had been wrong to hold that the estoppel by convention continued to have effect after the refusal of the section 73 application by BCC on 28 January 2014. Once that application had run its course, the parties were free to resile from the common assumption as to the meaning of Appeal. There was nothing in the September/October 2013 agreement which touched on events outside the scope of that agreement itself. Neither side had argued at trial that the collateral agreement under which Sainsbury’s agreed to make its section 73 application had a significance beyond 28 January 2014. Indeed Sainsbury’s had argued that any estoppel by convention that was generated would only have been binding in the event that the section 73 application had been successful. 82. Mr Matthias points out that Sainsbury’s did not decline to make a further section 73 application on the basis that it was an Appeal which had not passed the 60% test. Instead it had argued that any new permission would still be subject to a Store Onerous Condition because it would be accompanied by unacceptable noise mitigation measures, or that they were not obliged to make more than one such application. 83. Mr Wonnacott supported the decision of the judge. In addition to drawing attention to the passages in the later correspondence which I have set out in paragraphs 42 and 43 above, he relies on the fact that it was part of Bristol’s case that there was an estoppel by convention that a section 73 application was an Appeal for the purposes of the Agreement. Bristol had so argued in order to defer the Cut Off Date by relying on the section 73 application made by Sainsbury’s. Thus, for example, in paragraph 14 be of the re-re-amended defence, Bristol pleaded: “Further or alternatively, the parties acted on a shared assumption that an Application pursuant to Section 73 in respect of a Planning Permission which was not an Acceptable Planning Permission constituted an Appeal in the context of the Agreement, in that the Claimant made such an assertion through its solicitors but offered to pursue an Appeal by way of an application without first seeking the advice of Planning Counsel as to the prospects of such an Appeal succeeding, if the Defendant would agree that condition 11 of the Original Permission constituted a Store Onerous Condition, and the Defendant accepted such offer and agreed that condition 11 of the Original Permission constituted a Store Onerous Condition in consideration of the Claimant making such application without first seeking the advice of Planning Counsel. In the premises it would be unjust and unconscionable for the Claimant now to be permitted to go back upon that shared assumption, and the Claimant is estopped by convention from doing so.” 84. I start with the principles. In Republic of India v India Steamship Co Ltd (No 2) [1998] AC 878 at page 913 Lord Steyn set out the requirements of an estoppel by convention: “It is settled that an estoppel by convention may arise where parties to a transaction act on an assumed state of facts or law, the assumption being either shared by them both or made by one and acquiesced in by the other. The effect of an estoppel by convention is to preclude a party from denying the assumed facts or law if it would be unjust to allow him to go back on the assumption: The August Leonhardt [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 28; The Vistafjord [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 343; Treitel, Law of Contracts, 9th ed., at 112-113. It is not enough that each of the two parties acts on an assumption not communicated to the other. But it was rightly accepted by counsel for both parties that a concluded agreement is not a requirement for an estoppel by convention.” 85. In Hiscox v. Outhwaite [1992] 1 AC 562 at 575 Lord Donaldson added the rider: “once a common assumption is revealed to be erroneous, the estoppel will not apply to future dealings.” 86. In Troop v Gibson [1986] EGLR 1 Ralph Gibson LJ said: “… the doctrine of estoppel, when applied, deprives a party of the ability to enforce a legal right for the period of time and to the extent required by the equity which the estoppel has raised….” 87. As to the way in which the estoppel operates, Mr Wonnacott placed some reliance on what Lord Denning said in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd. [1982] QB 84. First, in a passage concerned with the way in which “a course of dealing may give rise to obligations” he said at page 121: “If it can be used to introduce terms which are not already there, it must also be available to add to, or vary, terms which are there already, or to interpret them. If parties to a contract, by their course of dealing, put a particular interpretation on the terms of it – on the face of which each of them – to the knowledge of the other – acts conducts their mutual affairs – they are bound by that interpretation just as much as if they had written it down as being a variation of the contract.” 88. Later, in the same section of his judgement, Lord Denning said this: “So I come to this conclusion: When the parties to a contract are both under a common mistake as to the meaning or effect of it – and thereafter embark on a course of dealing on the footing of that mistake – thereby replacing the original terms of the contract by a conventional basis on which they both conduct their affairs, then the original contract is replaced by the conventional basis. The parties are bound by the conventional basis. Either party can sue or be sued upon it just as if it had been expressly agreed between them.” 89. Finally, under the heading “Conclusion”, Lord Denning said: “When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption – either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so. If one of them does seek to go back on it, the courts will give the other side remedy as the equity of the cases demands.” 90. Under the September/October 2013 agreement Sainsbury’s secured agreement that Condition 11 was a Store Onerous Condition, something which was in dispute, and could have been resolved against them. This was to the disadvantage of Bristol, who could otherwise have contended that the Store Planning Condition was satisfied. In return for Bristol’s agreement about Condition 11, Sainsbury’s agreed to lodge a section 73 application, a step which, on the common misapprehension that it was an Appeal, would otherwise have needed to pass the 60% test. This was a concession by Sainsbury’s, who could (on the mistaken assumption) have insisted on the matter being placed before Planning Counsel, jointly instructed by the parties. It was also (on the mistaken assumption) a perceived benefit to Bristol, who thereby avoided any possibility of Planning Counsel rating the prospects as less than 60%. Both sides were concerned to avoid potential uncertainties which could have been fatal to their immediate objectives: in the case of Sainsbury’s to avoid the Agreement becoming unconditional, and in the case of Bristol to avoid Sainsbury’s planning obligations becoming spent. 91. The compromise was plainly determinative of the question whether a section 73 application was an Appeal for the purposes of the September/October 2013 agreement. Did the compromise bind the parties so that neither could subsequently assert that a section 73 application was not an Appeal, even after 28 January 2014 when the section 73 application was refused? It would do so only if it would be unconscionable for them to do so. 92. The judge did not spell out the reasons why she considered that it would be unconscionable for the parties to resile from the common assumption that a section 73 application was an Appeal for the purposes of the Agreement. However, it is not difficult to see why this should be so. Firstly, although the mistaken common assumption about the meaning of Appeal in paragraph 2.11 of Schedule 1 occurred in the context of the September/October 2013 agreement, it was a common assumption about the way in which the main Agreement, and in particular paragraph 2.11 of Schedule 1 of that Agreement, worked. The date 28 January 2014 (the date of the refusal of Sainsbury’s section 73 application) therefore has no significance so far as the continued effect of the estoppel is concerned. Secondly, although the question of whether a section 73 application is an Appeal may seem an incidental and somewhat recondite question, its consequences for the operation of the Agreement are very important. Whether or not such an application is an Appeal can have an impact both on whether the Agreement becomes terminable (through the definition of Cut Off Date) and on whether Sainsbury’s are placed in breach of their obligations in paragraph 2.8 of Schedule 1. For Bristol to resile from the common assumption so as to place Sainsbury’s in breach is, on the face of it, unconscionable. Thirdly, although Sainsbury’s never expressly asserted that they were not obliged to lodge a second section 73 application because it was an Appeal which had not passed the section 73 test, preferring to rely on other points, it was plainly a part of their armoury on which they were entitled to rely. Fourthly Bristol never revealed to Sainsbury’s that it considered the common assumption to be erroneous. On the contrary, it continued to rely on the common assumption, and to assert that it would be unconscionable for Sainsbury’s to resile from it. 93. In those circumstances it would, in my judgment, plainly be unjust to allow Bristol now to assert that Sainsbury’s failure to lodge a further section 73 application was a breach of its planning obligations. Sainsbury’s were not obliged to lodge such an application unless Planning Counsel advised that it passed the 60% test, and this had not occurred.
Might have done better if Dudley Moore and Peter Cook had been the judges.
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kingswood Polak
Without music life would be a mistake
Joined: May 2014
Posts: 10,263
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Post by kingswood Polak on Mar 17, 2016 14:20:59 GMT
I don't think any one of us can see the bigger picture, I have it on very good authority that we had to contest the original verdict because we now have a watertight case against our solicitors for cocking up the contract and that they are now liable to pay out millions in compensation. I was told we were preparing a case against our legal team as well but I got vilified for saying it. That was over a year ago now.
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Deleted
Joined: January 1970
Posts: 0
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Post by Deleted on Mar 17, 2016 14:22:11 GMT
Too right, how dare they insist that contract terms are adhered to.
There can be a difference between legal and moral. We had a number of bids for the Mem at the time, we accepted the highest. Some years down the line, they pull out because it suits them to.
Ignoring the court case, Sainsburys cost us a lot of money with this spoiling bid, both in the direct spend on the Mem redevelopment and UWE stadium, and opportunity cost if we had sold to somebody who was actually serious about buying. If this was a deal to sell your house, you'd be pretty hacked off with the other party, and we are well within our rights to be hacked off by the poor business behaviour of Sainsburys.
The conditions were there in black and white, we agreed to them, 2 courts have ruled that nothing outside of the scope of the contract has occurred. So logically, according to you, we have agreed to an immoral contract? If I'm selling a property and a bid comes in significantly higher than any other I'll treat it with suspicion. We need to get beyond blaming others for f@ck ups on Higgs' watch. We agreed all of the contract terms, we didn't see that they had an easy out until it was too late. I'm waiting for an apology statement from Higgs.
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Post by a more piratey game on Mar 17, 2016 14:22:59 GMT
I've just seen the Toni the till interview today. He interviewed quite well I thought
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Post by a more piratey game on Mar 17, 2016 14:24:05 GMT
I don't think any one of us can see the bigger picture, I have it on very good authority that we had to contest the original verdict because we now have a watertight case against our solicitors for cocking up the contract and that they are now liable to pay out millions in compensation. I was told we were preparing a case against our legal team as well but I got vilified for saying it. That was over a year ago now. I think you might have nibbled there kp
'on very good authority' and 'watertight case' look like giveaways for me
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Deleted
Joined: January 1970
Posts: 0
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Post by Deleted on Mar 17, 2016 14:27:38 GMT
I think with any regime change, it's only prudent to keep the best of what you have and replace with better. If Mr Watola (with a silent 'T') is replaced, I would hope the replacement has a better working cv and can seek to improve on his position. With all the contacts and experience the new encumbrances bring, I'm more than confident that a suitable replacement can be found, and instinctively I would applaud that immediately. My 103 year old Grandma would do better than that quarter witted cretin, despite having died at 89 and having dementia. What has Watola ever done for you to think he's that good?
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kingswood Polak
Without music life would be a mistake
Joined: May 2014
Posts: 10,263
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Post by kingswood Polak on Mar 17, 2016 14:38:28 GMT
Let it go Tone. You did your best and it wasn't good enough. There were parts of the contract where we tried to change things yet still the concencus is that it's all Sainsburys fault. We got it wrong and allowed things to get out of hand. Supreme Court, really ? I really think that unless there is an agenda elsewhere then it's time to let go and move on. Personally, I am relieved this has been dealt with pretty soon in the new owners guardianship of the club and that the Al Qadi family can now sort things out and get on with the stadium sans the soap opera that this has been
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Deleted
Joined: January 1970
Posts: 0
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Post by Deleted on Mar 17, 2016 14:48:52 GMT
There can be a difference between legal and moral. We had a number of bids for the Mem at the time, we accepted the highest. Some years down the line, they pull out because it suits them to.
Ignoring the court case, Sainsburys cost us a lot of money with this spoiling bid, both in the direct spend on the Mem redevelopment and UWE stadium, and opportunity cost if we had sold to somebody who was actually serious about buying. If this was a deal to sell your house, you'd be pretty hacked off with the other party, and we are well within our rights to be hacked off by the poor business behaviour of Sainsburys.
The conditions were there in black and white, we agreed to them, 2 courts have ruled that nothing outside of the scope of the contract has occurred. So logically, according to you, we have agreed to an immoral contract? If I'm selling a property and a bid comes in significantly higher than any other I'll treat it with suspicion. We need to get beyond blaming others for f@ck ups on Higgs' watch. We agreed all of the contract terms, we didn't see that they had an easy out until it was too late. I'm waiting for an apology statement from Higgs.I wonder what one of those would sound like. It's a bit like waiting to hear a unicorn moo.
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Peter Parker
Global Moderator
Richard Walker
You have been sentenced to DELETION!
Joined: May 2014
Posts: 4,920
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Post by Peter Parker on Mar 17, 2016 14:48:59 GMT
I imagine Toni talking of Supreme court is very much a hangover for their project/regime.
Now it is out of the way. The Al Qadi ownership hopefully have a clear run, although £28m would have been handy
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Post by Henbury Gas on Mar 17, 2016 15:00:46 GMT
There can be a difference between legal and moral. We had a number of bids for the Mem at the time, we accepted the highest. Some years down the line, they pull out because it suits them to.
Ignoring the court case, Sainsburys cost us a lot of money with this spoiling bid, both in the direct spend on the Mem redevelopment and UWE stadium, and opportunity cost if we had sold to somebody who was actually serious about buying. If this was a deal to sell your house, you'd be pretty hacked off with the other party, and we are well within our rights to be hacked off by the poor business behaviour of Sainsburys.
The conditions were there in black and white, we agreed to them, 2 courts have ruled that nothing outside of the scope of the contract has occurred. So logically, according to you, we have agreed to an immoral contract? If I'm selling a property and a bid comes in significantly higher than any other I'll treat it with suspicion. We need to get beyond blaming others for f@ck ups on Higgs' watch. We agreed all of the contract terms, we didn't see that they had an easy out until it was too late. I'm waiting for an apology statement from Higgs.Why would he ? He is in Italy pissing some of your gate money up against the wall, laughing all the way to the bank I think he has done a blinder convincing a very rich family to take a dying club of his hands...
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Deleted
Joined: January 1970
Posts: 0
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Post by Deleted on Mar 17, 2016 15:04:44 GMT
I've just seen the Toni the till interview today. He interviewed quite well I thought It's always easier when you are interviewed by one of your co workers with pre agreed questions.
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